Introduction
In the first half of the XX century M. Scheler fairly noticed that "in no historical era has the human being become so much of a problem to himself as in ours" (Scheler, 1927 (Scheler, /2009 .
Almost a century later it is possible to claim firmly that the problematical character of the human being doesn't disappear anywhere. The discourse about the human being still contains more questions, than answers. One of such questions without an unambigiuous answer is the mind-body problem which can be expressed as follows: how is the work of human consciousness connected with the structure of human brain?
The mind-body problem is considered now from the position of various theoretical approaches.
The detailed review of such approaches is provided by K. Ludwig (Ludwig, 2003) . Ludwig allocates four statements which, according to his opinion, look plausible, but at the same time can't be true at once because they are contradicting each other: "1 Realism. Some things have mental properties. 2 Conceptual autonomy. Mental properties are not conceptually reducible to non-mental properties, and, consequently, no non-mental proposition entails any mental proposition. 3 Constituent explanatory sufficiency. A complete description of a thing in terms of its basic constituents, their non-relational properties, and relations to one another and to other basic constituents of things, similarly described (the constituent description) entails a complete description of it, i.e., an account of all of a thing's properties follows from its constituent description. 4 Constituent non-mentalism. The basic constituents of things do not have mental properties as such" (Ludwig, 2003, pp. 10-11) . Further classification of theoretical approaches to the mind-body problem is built by Ludwig depending on acceptance or non-acceptance of one or another statement listed above. It includes a number of concepts (and their versions): eliminativism, conceptual reductionism, conceptual anti-reductionism, ontological anti-reductionism (Ludwig, 2003, p. 13) . Without the purpose to consider each of the designated concepts in detail (Ludwig makes this), we note the following. Without accounting solipsism (universal pure "mental particle theory" in Ludwig's terminology) which Ludwig considers as a kind of realism, all other concepts listed by him are fully laid within two groups allocated earlier by J. Fodor: "Traditional philosophies of mind can be divided into two broad categories: dualist theories and materialist theories. In the dualist approach the mind is a nonphysical substance. In materialist theories the mental is not distinct from the physical; indeed, all mental states, properties, processes and operations are in principle identical with physical states, properties, processes and operations" (Fodor, 1981, p. 124) . It seems that such division really reflects the representations developed in modern philosophy.
It must be noted that both dualistic and materialistic approaches face certain difficulties in the explanation of the mind-body problem. At first sight, the materialistic theories are supported by science progress. Indeed, neurobiology in the XX century established that the brain percepts external signals by means of impulse polarization on all neural network, including the brain itself (Hubel, 1988) . A variety of specializations of a neural network gives human dimension, in which the direct perception of one outward things is possible by means of sense organs, but it is impossible for other outward things (for example, infrared radiation or ultrasound). Besides, scientists discovered functional asymmetry of cerebral hemispheres.
In particular, many researchers pay attention that the left hemisphere of a brain generally carries out abstracting activity, makes operations with abstract and ideal objects, while the work of the right hemisphere correlates with creative thinking (Ivanov, 1978; Chernigovskaia & Deglin, 1986; Geodakian, 1993; Merkulov, 1999; Deglin, 2001; Geodakian, 2005) . In turn, T. A. Dobrokhotova and N. N. Bragina assume the interesting thing: the hemispheres of a brain function in the present so that the right hemisphere represents the past and the left hemisphere is involved in conceivableness of the future (Dobrokhotova & Bragina, 1986) . A. N. Parshin draws a conclusion using the research of T. A. Dobrokhotova and N. N. Bragina that "the right hemisphere is more disposed to sensory actions, and the left is disposed to motor actions" (Parshin, 2001, p. 95) . On the whole practically all highest mental functions (perception, memory, speech etc.) are implemented by right and left hemispheres differently (Hellige, 1993; The Asymmetrical Brain, 2004) .
Thus, the brain functional activity indicates certain somatic pre-conditions of conscious activity of a human being. Philosophers couldn't help being interested in it. As a result the great number of naturalistic concepts of consciousness was created, up to the so-called theory of identity of consciousness and brain according to which the mental event is identical to some event or state in a brain in a literal sense (Priest, 1991) .
But at the same time even adherents of the theory of identity generally deny that statements about consciousness mean the same as statements about processes in a brain (Priest, 1991, p. 102) . There is the gap between the languages describing subjective feelings of a human being and physiological processes in his body, and overcoming of this gap is hardly possible now. In our opinion, T. Nagel characterizes this situation rather precisely: "…We cannot see how a detailed account of what is going on in the brain could exhaustively explain the taste of a cigar -not even if we could see how it explained all the physical effects of such an experience" (Nagel, 1998, p. 343 (Markov, 1997) . Besides, the critics of the theory of identity (and concepts similar to it) point to the fact that the naturalistic hypotheses yield to neither verification nor falsification at the present stage of science progress (Nagel, 1974, pp. 446-447) . Indeed, still nobody succeeded to catch the content of thought or feeling by means of neurobiology methods.
As for dualism, in our opinion, J. Fodor designates the main difficulty of this approach quite precisely: "The chief drawback of dualism is its failure to account adequately for mental causation. If the mind is nonphysical, it has no position in physical space. How, then, can a mental cause give rise to a behavioral effect that has a position in space? To put it another way, how can the nonphysical give rise to the physical without violating the laws of the conservation of mass, of energy and of momentum?" (Fodor, 1981, p. 124) .
Statement of the problem
It seems that the designated contradictions in both materialistic and dualistic approaches arise because these approaches are based on subject-object opposition, or, in other words, precise defusion of the outside objective world and the subjective image of this world arising in consciousness. However, as it will be shown further, concepts "subjective" and "objective", being habitual and even intuitively clear, are not so obvious as it looks like and require the comprehension. In this case it is possible to agree with T. Nagel's critics of thinking conservatism of those philosophy mind agents who try "to reinterpret mental concepts so as to make them tractable parts of the framework of physical science" (Nagel, 1998, p. 347 ). According to Nagel, "a search for something more unfamiliar, something which starts from the conceptual unintelligibility, in its present form, of the subjective-objective link" is required instead (Nagel, 1998, p. 347) . Following this intension, we suppose to uncover sense of the mind-body dualism irrelatively to traditionally understood subject-object opposition. This can be designated as the purpose of our research.
Theoretical framework
In this work we are guided by the ideas of its being and validity in me and from me myself" (Husserl, 1929 (Husserl, /2003 . Such approach requires the construction of another ontology different from the classical subject-object opposition.
Although subject-object opposition is strongly fixed in philosophical knowledge and still many philosophical theories are built on it, approach of nonclassical philosophy, according to which the subject and object are defined only in their interaction, seems more reliable to us. From this point of view until the interaction act with the world happened there is no pre-set (with already certain properties) subject of knowledge for whom the observed pre-set world is an external independent object. Such situation looks like it was described by I. A. Bondarenko: "Must be at least one creature executing this minimum of an inclusiveness and if such "included" creature took place, we are already in a certain world (in which something is possible, and something is already impossible). In other words, we are not in a space of potentially possible things, but in this (i.e. defined) world, so defined world (because we could be defined in a different way. In this sense the inquiring about the world in itself is pseudoinquiring)" (Bondarenko, 2002, p. 29) .
Methods
The main philosophical method we use is the phenomenological method. Phenomenology is frequently interpreted as one of philosophical theories. In turn, we (as M. Heidegger) consider the phenomenology from another side -as methodological approach, realizing at the same time that the phenomenology isn't only reduced to methodological procedure. In work "Being and Time" Heidegger emphasizes that "the expression "phenomenology" signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize the "what" of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content but the "how" of such research" (Heidegger, 1927 (Heidegger, /1996 . This "how" assumes, in fact, the researcher's shift of attention from the perceived content to the event of perception something itself. Such change of attention is what they call the phenomenological reduction which allows to see phenomena (that is) with evidence.
Discussion
As it was stated earlier, the mind-body problem is usually considered in terms of subject-object opposition. Indeed it is possible to agree with D. Hoffman asserting the following: practically all mind-body theories are based on the assumption that "a goal of perception is to match or approximate true properties of an objective physical environment" (Hoffman, 2008, p. 92 For example, if one works with files, he doesn't need to understand all complexity of the processes happening inside the computer. He deals only with the user interface which is "the total reality of the computer" for him (Hoffman, 2008, p. 95) . In other words, we make operations with the icons representing application or file. However these operations with the icons don't seem at all those real processes which happen inside the computer. Similar with the perception, but in this case the real situation, unlike an example with the computer, is inaccessible to a human being at all. We are always inside the perception, and can't look at perceived by someone's eyes from the outside.
In this situation there is no sense to look for the mental basis in the physiology which is understood as something external for mental. MUIs" (Hoffman, 2008, p. 108 ). It appears that any scientific or philosophical reasoning on what structure preceding to a mental event generates this event, isn't correct at all. One can speak more or less certain about his experience of consciousness only being in this experience that is directly endured at present as the actual event of his world (being fully honest, it is impossible to assert with confidence the possibility of consciousness experience for other human beings (Nagel, 1987, pp. 19-26) ). The attempts to deduce this experience from something external don't make sense -it isn't expressed in the cause-effect relations (the cause-effect relations are the subject of science), it simply is. (Kant, 1781 (Kant, /1998 . Really, the spatio-temporal description of the world is included obviously or unobviously in any our sensible statement about it.
Let us note that it is not enough to have the only minimum designated above (the evidence that world and human being have been defined) for the ontological description of the mental act.
Kant understood this perfectly, when he offers the terms "sensibility" and "understanding": "Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former (sensibility. -D. K.) an object is given to us, through the latter (understanding. -D. K.) it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition" (Kant, 1781 (Kant, /1998 .
Actually Kant says here that in every act of perception two events are realized simultaneously (not in a sequence): event itself and its content.
In other words, we, firstly, perceive something, And even for an ontological attempt which is to proceed in this way, some idea of the being of the whole would have to be presupposed" (Heidegger, 1927 (Heidegger, /1996 . In our opinion, the use of subject-object opposition destroys this wholeness and doesn't allow to get closer to understanding of the being of thought.
Conclusion
Summarizing the result, it is possible to say the following. The mind-body problem as the problem of interrelation and interconditionality of mental and physiological arises when one proceeds from the classical subject-object opposition.
Accepting the subject-object opposition as the convenient way for a scientist to speak about the phenomena of this world (the way that shouldn't be equal to the world itself), it is already senseless to look for the reason of a mental event out of this event. Mental states are not the data of sense organs received from somewhere outside and processed by a brain (which also plays a part of something separate and independent from conscious act), it is the phenomena understood by themselves. Heidegger was right when said that the "ontological foundations can never be disclosed by subsequent hypotheses derived from empirical material. Rather, they are always already "there" even when that empirical material is only collected" (Heidegger, 1927 (Heidegger, /1996 .
Life is understood by the life itself, the being is reflected only when we already are in the being.
A sсeptic could object here: we can injure the certain lobes of a brain of another human being and see evidently that he is deprived of opportunity to think and understand now. But what does allow to declare it responsibly, except the external manifestations observed by us?
We never were into the similar states, they are impenetrable for us at all. T. Nagel characterizes the similar situation when he writes: "…The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him" (Nagel, 1974, p. 440) . And herein it is possible to agree with him. However, the assumption that other people can really have consciousness experience which is similar to mine, is a quite appropriate in a certain situation. This assumption can't be subjected to verification or falsification, however in a philosophical discourse it is admissible and even necessary. Such assumption allows me to treat the other as human being (alive, feeling, experiencing), so to keep human in myself. 
